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Abstract 
This thesis is an exploration of the way in which David 
Malouf develops ideas of epistemology and ontology in three of 
his novels. The novels discussed are Child's Play (1982), The 
Great World (1990) and Remembering Babylon (1993). 
Of particular concern here are the dlfferent ways in which 
figures in the text are constructed as having imperfect and 
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All of David Malouf's novels resist the establishment of an 
unproblematic, singular reality. Instability, doubt and fragile balance are 
consistently privileged over certainty and stability. Examination of Child's 
Play, The Great World, and Remembering Babylon reveals tbat Malours work 
exposes the possibility of an essentialism or universality in human 
experience. It will also be shown that ideas of culture, history and even 
language as reducible constructs are never disposed of in the texts. The 
distinction, in these novels, between identity as an ephemeral and unreliable 
phenomenon, and as the site of essence and certainty, is the central concern 
of this paper. 
Epistemological concerns emerge at a number of levels within the 
texts. At tbe level of uarration, in Child's Play, problems of kuowledge are 
foregrounded and made dominant over other considerations. At the level of 
story in Remembering Babylon it is the conflicting cultural epistemologies 
of the characters that are exposed by the ~ovel. Epistemological regimes are 
often, but not always, associated with failure and disaffection for the figures 
in the novels. The distinctions drawn between satisfactory and 
unsatisfactory systems of knowing will be examined. 
Alongside epistemological considerations in Malouf there are 
ontological ones. The paradigm employed here in distinguishing between 
areas of inquiry is tbat employed by McHale (1987) in his Postmodernist 
Fiction. In this work he defines epistemological questions as being of the 
order, quoting Higgins (1978), "How can I interpret this world of which I am 
a part7 And wbat am I in it7" (McHale.1987:9) 
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McHale goes on to propose that additional epistemological questions may take 
the form: 
What is there to be known? Who knows it?; How do they 
know it, and with what degree of certainty?; How is knowledge 
transmitted from one knower to another, and with what degree of 
reliability?; How does the object of knowledge change as it passes 
from knower to knower? What are the limits of the knowable? And 
soon. 
(McHale.l987:9} 
QJlestions of ontology are seen, and again McHale quotes Higgins, to be of the 
order: "Which world is this? What is to be done in it? Which of my selves is to 
do it?" (McHale.1987:10} Other ontological questions which may be asked 
include: 
What is a world? What kinds of worlds are there, how are they 
constituted, and how do they differ?; What happens when different 
worlds are placed in confrontation, or when boundaries between 
worlds are violated? What is the mode of existence of a text, and what 
is the mode of existence of the world (or worlds) it projects?; .. 
(McHale.l987:10} 
McHale's project is to explore the nature of postmodern texts and his major 
thesis is that epistemological questions are foregrounded in modem texts 
while postmodern texts predominantly engage with ontological questions. 
This paper is not concerned with locating David Malours ficticn firmly in 
the camp of either movement, but will be looking at the ways in which the 
novels ask (and can be asked} both sets of questions. 
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Child's Play 
It has been suggested that Child's Play is 'Malours only postmodern 
book' (Salusinszky.1993:7). Such a statement tells us little about either the 
novel or postmodernism. It is impossible to gauge what criteria were being 
employed to isolate the signal elements of the novel or the defining qualities 
of postmodernism. Certainly Child's Play is not a realist text and does employ 
strategies of .. magic realism'. All of Malouf's novels fracture the conventions 
of realism to some extent and, in any case, realist conventions are fractured 
similarly by modern and postmodern authors. Pastiche is an element of the 
text, and so is a kind of schizophrenia, but Jameson's model of postmodernism 
(Jameson.1984:53-92) must be severely distorted in order to accommodate 
Child's Play (or vice versa). 
According to McHale, if Child's Play is to be successfully regarded as a 
postmodem text then it desperately seeks to have ontological questions asked 
of it before being quizzed on its epistemological concerns. The reverse 
appears to be the case. 
The primary question asked in, by and of Child's Play is that which McHale 
frames as his epistemological paradigm; "How can I interpret this world of 
which I am a part?" The interpretation of the world in this novel is not 
merely incidental to ontological questions, but is instead the central 
storehouse of tropes out of which ontology is permitted. 
Both Amanda Nettelbeck (1989) and Stephen Woods (1988) draw 
attention to the ambiguities and contradictions present in Child's Play. Woods 
is particularly concerned with the narrative strategies employed and how 
they contribute to the novel's: 
.. .'subversion• of traditional assumptions about realism, the author, 




Nettelbeck's concern is more for the way in which the text: 
... functions both thematically and structurally to undennine 
discursive assumptions and hence to undermine the hierarchizing 
of power through Wstory. 
(Nettelbeck.1989:31-44) 
The validity of both claims is supported by the text but there is also a sense in 
which both claims rely on the novel's foregrounding of epistemological 
themes. 
The questions that the terrorist poses and the 'knowledges' that he 
claims are initially established as being of an empiricist nature. Concrete 
experience and the assumption of a stable process of time inform his view of 
the world. This is evidenced in his appraisal of the old abandoned 
farmhouse: '1 had known the place as a child and always loved it.'(CP:l). In 
this statement we have an affirmation that material things, and knowledges, 
exist across time. That the link, for the terrorist, between knowledge, time 
and the material world is considerable is shown by this passage: 
.. I walked alone to an abandoned farmhouse on the other side of the 
stream that was up for sale at least and wWch I thought I might 
make a bid for; a way perhaps of ensuring the future would exist by 
setting my hand to an official document, a ninety-nine year lease. 
(CP:l) 
The terrorist's act of walking alone is in itself an affirmation of 
identity, of singularity in a world verifiable only through personal 
experience. His view goes beyond this, however, in that he sees time- 'the 
future' - as being contingent on the material, verifiable, 'official document'. 
Nettelbeck suggests that these passages establish history as a : .. 'mystery' 
whose only significance is constructed from the individual's desire for a 
meaningful past and a predictable future' (1988:31-44). But it is more than 
desire for, it is an already established interpretation of. The distinction is 
that desire indicates a lack, while interpretation indicates an established 
facility. 
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At the beginning of the novel the terrorist is represented as having rather a 
clear cut epistemological system; one that accepts the possibility of some 
knowledges, but sets limits to others. It is the demonstrated inadequacy of 
this initial system, through the novel, that creates the 'undermining' effect 
that Nettelbeck discusses. 
The apparent stability of the terrorist's system of knowing is demonstrated a 
number of times in the opening pages of the novel. The Etruscan 
inscriptions are beyond interpretation in this system of knowing, but there 
is still a sense in which he admits them into his material world. His 
childhood attempts at translating the wtiting are recalled and the idea that 
he once 'stood in a unique relationship' with the script make him smile 
(CP:2). Recognition of the folly of his once held view does not stop him from 
repeating his interpretive attempt. This emphasises his currently held view 
that the material world, if not known, or known only partially, is at least 
knowable. 
The terrorist, at this stage, not only admits to the incompleteness of 
his knowledge, but relies on the propagation of only partial knowledge for 
his survival: 
But l should introduce myself. 
l am twenty-nine years old and male. You will understand if I 
decline to give further particulars. 
l am what the newspapers call a terrorist. (CP:4) 
It is here that the terrorist raises the question of different epistemologies 
existing concurrently. The first 'I am' in the passage is not the Cartesian 'I 
am' of rationalism; it is firmly linked to empiricism, to phenomena 
quantifiable in years or verifiable by examination. The second 'I am' is one 
which admits two major possibilities; that the regimes of knowledge of the 
terrorist are external to language or that they are contingent on it. 
There is a maze of ambiguity and contradiction in this simple 
sentence. The immediate ironic meaning that spriD.gs out is that the terrorist 
is something more than his journalistic label; that the 'knowledges' of 
inscription and language are inadequate in their ability to capture any sense 
of what he 'is'. 
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The alternative meaning entails the terrorist subordinating his 'selr 
and 'knowledge' to that of the newspaper. In other words, he is what the 
newspapers call him. The possibility, at least, of his being constructed as a 
product of discourse, of his being unable to separate himself from the 
tyranny of language, is admitted at this point. Nettelbeck states that the 
ambiguous nature of the terrorist's introduction of himself; 'opens up the 
possibility of other significations, in other discourses.' (1989:33-44). It does 
more than that, however, in the sense that it is the moment at which the 
terrorist's empiricist outlook is potentially fractured for the first time. That 
it is ambiguous prefigures the concerns developed in the rest of the novel. 
These concerns are, in large part, explorations of what happens when the 
asking of epistemological questions starts to turn into the asking of 
ontological ones. 
A point of considerable crossover between empiricist and rationalist 
outlooks is established in the terrorist's description of his lucky pebble. The 
narrator struggles between modes of interpretation, between stripping 
himself away to his rational core and clinging to a belief in the solid. 
In cutting myself off from the past and relinquishing every object 
that might identify me I have made one exception; it is a small one, a 
variegated pebble I found as a child on the beach at M. and have kept 
ever since as a talisman. (CP:62) 
The tension between the terrorists 'knowledge' of the material and his 'faith' 
in the arcane is highlighted at a number of points. The conflict is made 
evident in the form of self contradiction. Having already established 
quantitative, morphological and temporal classification of the pebble 
-'small', 'variegated' and 'found as a child' - the terrorist proposes a less 
empirical appraisal: 
Held on the palm of my hand I saw reflected in it the far side of the 
universe, invisible to us, ... still in touch (and I through it) with a 
million other particles elsewhere, all of them responsive still to the 
tide of energy from 'out there'. (CP:63) 
This is hardly a hardened empiricist talking and, surely enough, the ideas 
are immediately dismissed as : 'Schoolboy fancies, all.' (CP:63) But the 
conflict continues with the statement that' they have persisted.' (CP:63). 
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The reasons for their persistence are even stated as an argument between 
epistemological regimes. They have persisted: 
Not because I believe them, or have been unable to give up a 
childish habit of thought, but because they invoke in me real 
responses that have nothing to do with the fantastic and which still 
nourish and sustain the spirit. (CP:63) 
The terrorist's claims to 'knowledge', to access to the 'real', are again 
expressed in ambiguous terms. Do the fancies persist for reasons for reasons 
other than the fact that the terrorist does believe them or do they persist 
even though he does not believe them? Either way admits that the terrorist 
is far from being in possession of an unshakeable empiricism. 
Photography is another site of fractured reality and uncertainty for 
the terrorist. Woods, in seeing the novel as a critique of realist fiction, sees 
the failure of photography in the novel as a metaphor for the failure of all 
mimetic art: 
Realism is unachievable because it is based on objectivity, whereas 
the notion of 'the real' is fundamentally a matter of perception and 
therefore subjectivity. (Woods.1988:326) 
The terrorist experiences something of a dilemma in his appraisal of the 
pictures of his dead colleagues: 
There are pictures. They are terribly distorted, the figures already 
dissolving as they move quickly on out of life .... 
Newspaper photography. 
Far from catching life it disintegrates and dissolves it ... (CP:113) 
The terrorist's comments take on a greater significance when we consider 
Roland Bartbes' claims of photography in Camera Lucida. Bartbes claims 
that photography is the medium in which the signifier and the referent are 
perceived as having the greatest proximity: 
... the photograph's immobility is the result of perverse confusion 
between two concepts: the Real and the live. By attesting that the 
object bas been real, the photograph surreptitiously induces belief 
that it is alive .. 
(Barthes.1981. 79) 
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While Barthes sees the photograph as presenting possibilities of reality and 
life, the terrorist sees the newspaper as offering falsehood and death. Both 
ascribe to the medium of photography power beyond simple representation: 
both also recognise the completely illusory nature of this power. Both are, 
however, able to be seduced by it. Barthes writes of history and his mother: 
No anamnesis could ever make me glimpse this time starting from 
myself- whe..-eas, contemplating a photograph in which she is 
hugging me, a child, against her, I can waken in myself the rumpled 
softness of her crepe de Chine and the perfume of her rice powder. 
(Barthes.1981:6S) 
The terrorist also has things which a photograph can waken in himself, or 
nearly: 
I find myself fingering the surface of the photograph and being 
surprised that the rocks are not jagged, that the roughness of that 
boy's jacket, which the light inside the photograph make so real, 
cannot be felt. ( CP: 111) 
Photographs and dreams have the same epistemological framework for the 
terrorist. They are things which appear to be verifiable by induction, by the 
unproblematic play of the senses, but turn out to be closed doors to 
alternative realities: 
[They tease] me with the deepest and most physical sense of space, 
light, weather, of the various texture of things, of huge and 
inevitable sadness, but when I try to enter its reality I cannot. 
(CP:lll) 
The terrorist is initially unable to enter the reality of the photograph 
because the photograph is unable to satisfy the requirements of a reality 
mediated only by the senses. It is here that the terrorist also proposes what 
is largely an ontological question: 'Is this what the dead feel?' He finds the 
answer to that question and, again, it is directly associated with photography. 
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The photographs used in the planning of the terrorist's assassination of the 
Great Writer provide, or are meant to provide, a: ' .. complete t!lree-hundred-
and-sixty degree view'. But the terrorist is alert to the gaps inherent in the 
photographic interpretation of the piazza at P .: 
The gaps are not in the physical picture that presents itself to 
me ... but arise, as one might predict, from the difference between 
knowing a place in your five senses, as a three dimensional space in 
which you move and breathe ... and a knowledge that has been 
arrived at by induction ... The gaps, I mean, are in myself. (CP:28-9) 
It is in one of these gaps that the terrorist flnds himself after his death. He 
goes into the street: 
.. that curves away to the east of the palace, which had so fascinated 
me i.!l the photographs and round whose bend in time I had been 
unable to see. (CP:144) 
While the novel demands to be asked the question - 'Which world is 
this?' - the terrorist has no compulsion to ask that question. His earlier 
query about how the 'dead feel' is subordinated to a persistently empirical 
outlook. His certainty is only shaken slightly when he is: ' .. a little surprised 
to discover that I am already at the edge of town.' (CP:145). His faith in bis 
ability to 'know' is evidenced by his ability to name things; to make a list of 
tangibles and to exclude that which fractures his view of a solid world. The 
certainty, the 'knowledge', possessed by the terrorist is even elevated to a 
level above that which he has held in the past. He is now possessed of the: 
' ... miraculous assurance of being safe at last . .' (CP:145) 
For a figure who has been so intently involved in analysis and in the 
construction of an orderly plan, the terrorist seems rather underwhelmed by 
the change in the circumstances of his postmortem reality. His failure to 
question the new nature of his being, his failure to ask the ontological 
questions, is part of the ultimate inability of his empirical system to reveal 
the 'truth' of anything. 
-10-
There are many games and many players in Child's Play: the cWld 
terrorist experiencing the harmony of the universe through a pebble or 
solving an ancient mystery, the dancing terrorists, the avant garde 
performers with their ice and black milk, schoolboys playing soccer, 
children playing tag and men and women playing more ridiculous games. In 
many of these the terrorist is merely a spectator. He does not need to 
participate; he has his own game of strategy, analysis and interpretation. 
Both Woods and Nettelbeck establish the terrorist as a metaphor for 
the literary critic. They emphasise the terrorist's role as both a reader of 
texts and as a writer. Woods suggests that: 
Structuralist and post-structuralist theories and critiques of 
authorship are conveyed metaphorically through the narrative, 
rather than by exposition ... the ideas wWch Barthes [in 'The Death of 
the Author'] puts forward are rendered metaphorically in the 
terrorist/narrator's story. 
(Woods.1988:328) 
Amanda Nettelbeck is more concerned with the deconstructive critical 
practices undertaken by the terrorist: 
The terrorist's aim, then is to explode the solidity of the letter, to 
expose that pan:.dox of language as a marker of both presence and 
absence in meaning. 
(Nettelbeck.1989:41) 
As a critic the terrorist certainly covers a great deal of ground. There is no 
text which he is reluctant to tackle; from ancient glyphs to (as Nettelbeck 
points out) the death rattle of the Great Writer's daughter. Photographs are 
scrutinised as are newspapers, dreams and the writings of his intended 
victim. There is even an attempt to extend his critical practices to the 
cinema: 
The girls are always naked. The football players wear their boots 
and a red and wWte striped jersey, and once one of the girls has a 
jersey, number 7: the passes and combinations a kind of off-the-
field-game. (CP:98) 
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A game, but not child's play. Tbis is tbe reductio ad absurdum of 
textual interpretation but is also a metaphor for all of the terrorist /critic's 
attempts to impose a unity of meaning on to what he sees. The implied search 
for significance in the number on the jersey of an actress in a pornographic 
film is ultimately no more futile than the search for the essence of the Great 
Writer in the magazine articles on:' .. water as a regenerative symbol in his 
novels .. ' (CP:117). The pornographic film itself is no less a text, and no more 
absurd a text, than the experimental theatre to which the terrorist is 
introduced: 
Once we gave a performance for nine hours in a warehouse, on a 
stage made of blocks of ice. We just kept on saying the same four 
sentences over and over .• until the ice melted. Some Fascists threw 
stones at us, it was sensational. ( CP:86) 
With the terrorist seen as critic it becomes possible to see his 
epistemological regime as a metaphor for critical practice. Just as a unity of 
meaning is impossible for the terrorist, so is an unshakeable system of 
'knowing'. As his carefully formulated masterwork of critical practice - the 
killing - goes astray at the critical moment, so does his carefully formulated 
empiricism. He is, however, unable to recognise this. Fortunately for him 
he blithely finds sanctuary when he is inscribed into one of the texts that he 
sought to interpret. 
Child's Play is 'about' many things in the sense that it is around many 
things. The layers of metaphor, ambiguity and lack of closure compromise 
the periphery of a curiously shaped form with many centres. It is about 
terrorism; a shadowy world of murky motives, of obscured psychologies and 
of mediation by the media. In another sense though, the novel is no more 
about terrorism than Fly Away Peter is about bird-watching or trench 
warfare. 
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The novel is also about criticism in an undeniable way. While David 
Malouf appears, wittingly rather than unwittingly, to have employed 
Barthes' structuralist theory on the role of the author as his major thematic 
paradigm there is no reason why an/ other theoretical model/ s could not be 
claimed in the same way. Foucault, Malouf and the Panoptic Realm and 
Macherey, Malouf and Materialism are, as yet, unwritten texts. Had they 
been inscribed, or when they are, then Child's Play is/will be about them 
too. 
David Malours novel is also about epistemology and on-:;:ology. Regimes 
of knowledge are explored and expo~ed as being inadequate to explain the 
world with any certainty. Modes of being are explored without being 
hierarchised - all modes of being ultimately subordinated to the links 
between the inscribed and the inscriber. 
While the terrorist is able to kill his Great Author the text is still 
unable to kill off its actual author. David Malouf comments, in an interview 
with Richard Kelly Tipping, (1989) that inChild's Play he: 
..• hoped the reader of the book would be put into [the terrorist's] 
position, and by finding himself there might be led to occupy, at least 
momentarily, the ambiguous moral position of the terrorist in a - well -
subversive way. But it was a book about writing, about reading. Like a 
great many of my books, ultimately I suppose, it's a book about the problems 
of interpretation. 
(Tipping.l989:492-502) 
Those problems of interpretation are never satisfactorily resolved in Child's 
Play; they prove never to be completely resolved in any of Maloufs work to 
date. 
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The Great World 
.. and prizes for keen-sightedness for those best able to remember 
the order of sequence among the passing shadows and so best be able 
to divine their future appearances. Plato: The Republic. 
(lee.1987:319) 
The Great World stands in considerable contrast to Child's Play . While the 
earlier novel was concerned with reading and writing, there is a much more 
substantial element of story-telling in the The Great World • Rather than 
inscription and interpretation being the central thematic concerns, it is 
narration and identity that are the objects of focus. If Child's Play 
problematises the literary document then The Great World challenges 
assumptions about personal testament. The realm of the inunediate senses 
figures as an important site of meaning for both of the central characters in 
this novel; yet both figures experience the world on a level which 
incorporates less inductive modes of knowing. Both figures also undergo 
processes of change but still retain much of what it is that serves to 
individualise them. 
The young Digger is concerned with the testament of the outside 
world, This initially takes the form of listening to his father's stories of the 
war; of absorbing them to the extent that he gets to: ' .. know the men's names 
as if he had known them• (GW:26). He recognises the link, the closeness, 
between the figures in the stories and his father. But, just as Digger comes to 
know and experience something of the lives of these men, his father seems 
to remain in a difficult relationship with his own narrative: 
Billy Keen told these horror stories in a voice that scared even 
himself, as if no amount of telling would ever get him used to the 
fact that they had happened, and he had once been part of them. 
(GW:Z6-7) 
While testament, for the father, is no guarantee of reconciling past 
and present realities it offers a promise for Digger. He absorbs a range of 
narratives: ' ... from his father; from fellows tvo who talked to him at the open 
doors of their cars ... from books; from the pictures he had been to .. ' (GW.Z8). 
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While his father is unable to make sense of his own story, of his experience 
outside the Crossing, Digger is a natural storyteller who is able to inform his 
sister's view of the world: 
His voice, velvety in the dark of their little room, was what made the 
world real to her. A lot of what he told her was made up. She could 
not tell the difference. (GW:30) 
His father's stories are distillations of a life; recollections of pure moments of 
life and death. The young Digger has not absorbed enough of the world to 
require that distillation; his facility for memory and imagination keep the 
narratives of the world open to him. Above all, he ignores the shrouded 
warning of his mother: 
What she was really warning him of was the difference between 
what she called reality, or duty, or fate - she had different names for 
it on different occasions - and a hunger he had, and which his 
father had too, for something that began where her reality, 
however clear and graspable it was, left off. (GW:Z7) 
It is a vague awareness of: ' .. the sheer size of the world .. ' (GW:28), that marks 
Digger and his father from Marge Keen. The world that Digger sees, in 
particular, is one from which his mother is somehow excluded. 
Keen's Crossing is a place which offers the twin possibilities of 
entrapment and sanctuary. For Digger's mother and father it is the former 
which informs their understanding of the location. To them, the Crossing 
represents a periphery, a place of exile away from the centre of things. 
Billy Keen must find his endless wars to keep him in touch with the visceral 
awareness of life that he first experience in France. 
History had conspired, for a time, to set him in a world where risk, 
up to the very point of extinction, was a point of honour, and 
aulmal energy had scope. It was his natural element. After that, life 
at the Crossing seemed to hhn like daliy puulshment. (GW:13) 
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Marge persists with her task of civilising, colonising, the Crossing; imposing 
th-e: material and tangible on to what existed otherwise only as a name: 
Her vision was of a room with curtains, furniture, the smiling faces 
of children round a table piled high with food (including 
pineapples) and with good cutlery laid out and glass and plates .. 
(GW:ZO) 
Her relationship with the place, and her perception of it as a part of some 
periphery is evidence at the end: 
That wasn't what she had come to see. She hadn't even known it 
would be visible. in her mind it was further off than that. Halfway 
to England, practically. (GW:244) 
Andrew Taylor has noted that the Crossing is linked to: ' .. stability and 
permanence, rather that transition and change, .. ' (Taylor.1993;7). This is 
certainly the case, but there is also the sense in which that stability and 
permanence is a figure for centrality, for a fixed point around which 
everything else moves. The Crossing loses its functional significance as a 
river cross\ng (Taylor.1993:6) and, despite this, it retains its symbolic status 
as the static focus of the novel. All other locales will be shown to be 
ephemeral, to be contingent on the ability to look back on the Crossing. 
Keen's Crossing is quiet and insubstantial but the whole world will, for the 
figures in the novel, be found there. 
For Digger, initially, his home is a place that traps him. The travelling 
circus is a chance for escape: 
It was the chance it offered of stepping aside from what fate, or his 
mother, who claimed to be its agent, had set up for him. Of getting 
away. (GW:56) 
The circus is a place of deception and illusion, a place where the 
knowledges of its inhabitants and its clients are never adequate. The fat lady 
reads cheap romance novels while the human torso studies the racing form 
and right wing politics. Digger's own tasks include: '[making] himself one of 
the crowd .. to appeal to the spirit of emulation or savagery in them.' (GW:SS) 
The circus is also the site of world views radically different from those of 
Digger. The fat lady from Vienna and the anti-Semitic human torso from 
America are figures which represent experience as far from the Crossing, 
nearly, as one can get. Digger's way of looking at things is changed, 
however, to an even more different mode; to an approximation of that of the 
Aboriginal boxers: 'Living with the blacks had made him see things in 
another way: from the side and a bit skew . .' (GW:S7) This view is only held 
momentarily, as Digger joins up. The re-adoption of a white outlook is 
remarked on as the action of a "mug". Slinger laments: 'An' I thought we'd 
learned you something.' (GW:59). Digger learns from the circus but his 
education is far from complete; in fact, through the novel, he never stops 
learning. 
Newcastle, where Vic lives in his younger life is ; ' .. a dirty little town 
scattered at the edge of the sea, all unpainted timber and rusty iron .. ' 
(GW:84). The place where his father sinks into alcoholism, despair and rage, 
and his mother dies, is marked by "barren dunes" and by the detritus of 
human habitation. The yard is all; .. 'rusty cans, chop bones and bleached 
pippies and crab-shells . .' (GW:71) This place seems to be not just on the 
margin of things, but also in danger of being wiped off the map entirely as 
sand dunes advance on the shack in which the Currans live. 
The young Vic is established as a figure who, in contrast to Digger, 
lacks the influence of meaningful narrative. That narrative to which he is 
exposed is as horrible as Billy Keen's stories of men drowning in mud, but is 
worse since it is real: 
But there was no escaping the smell of it or the sounds she made as 
the last strength was tom from her. 'I'm sony, love, I'm sorry, 'she 
would murmur over and over. (GW:71) 
One of the narratives that Vic produces for himself directly recalls that 
disturbing image from the Western Front. He imagines a time when the sand 
dunes engulf the house and: ' .. lhe whole hill went over them. He would be 
fighting to get above it' (GW:71). 
In spite of this there is a sense in which some kind of essential nature 
sustains Vic: 'He wasn't by nature morose' (GW:72) More than this, there is a 
certainty in his own ability to shape his life: 'He would make his own life, not 
just pick up what was passed onto him. He would. He knew it.' (GW:74). 
Whether he does or not will prove to be a debatable point, there is no doubt 
that he, at least in his youth, believes he will. 
While the Warrender household is materially and emotionally more 
sustaining for Vic, there is still a sense in which he lacks both a 
geographical centre and a clearly defined identity. He is displaced from his 
roots, both at Marlin Street and at the shack. He feels something of an 
interloper, and something of an imposter, in the Warrender household: 
Another boy, with his sour miseries and deep anger hidden, had 
come along with him, and would push his feet each morning into the 
new shoes .... He felt the despair of that boy flow into his heart and 
sicken him. ( GW:S 7) 
This feeling of duality will form part of Vic's outlook for the remainder of 
the novel. The depression years, in particular, increase Vic's feelings of 
alienation and of unreality. He is dismayed at the lines of itinerant labourers 
and feels extreme discomfort at finding them in Meggsies's kitchen eating a 
hand-out of soup. The lines of unemployed men still hold a strange 
fascination: 
He didn't really want to know, but felt there was something wrong. 
He had got off too easily. He was in the wrong dream. (GW:l04) 
He starts, here, to actively formulate a world view, one in which 
epistemology is closely related to moral codes and behaviours. He 
rationalises that part of himself which he had considered coarse and his 
view takes on board some general principles: 
For one thing you had to see things the way they were. No good 
giving people credit for virtues they did not have. Most people were 
selfish. They had low motives rather than noble ones. (GW:IOS) 
The concrete and tangible has meaning for Vic. Andrew Taylor 
(1993:8) points out that he is also open to the poetic and imaginative. 
Professor Taylor draws attention to the reaction of Vic to the soap vats with 
the following quote: 
[Vic] .. might have called them poetic. He was not without idealism, or 
imagination either. But this did not prevent him from seeing these 
processes, in their real physical form, as what they were: natural 
occurrences ... (GW:lOS-6) 
It is not the mystical, poetic, or imaginative side of Vic that immediately 
appears to sustain him during his wartime imprisonment. What may 
initially be thought of Vic is that he is the pragmatist; the figure to whom 
Digger awak~s and sees wolfing down food which is not his own. This view, 
ignoring the conflicts within Vic, will turn OIJt to be inadequate. 
The figure of Jenny illustrates some of the thematic concerns of the 
novel. While she has a fractured sense of temporality and an incomplete 
grasp of what is going on around her, she also has an almost continuous link 
with the Crossing. Given that history is important in the novel and that 
history is, at some I2vel, associated with time then Jenny shows some of the 
ways in which the making of history is made problematic. 
Jenny, in spite of her simplicity or more probably, because of it, is the 
figure who is most sure of what she 'knows'. At every level her certainty, 
the orderliness of her system of making sense of the world is consistent and 
unencumbered with either Digger's fantastic memory or Vic's duality. That 
much of what she ~Jelieves is apocryphal is of little consequence - her 'truth' 
is ultimately of the same value as any other. 
Much of Jenny's significance is established on the first page of the 
novel. She not only has a temporal continuity that is required by history, 
but also has both ends of that continuum tied up into a loop. 
She is both an adult and a child and, consequently, is a distillation of what is 
generally referred to as history: 
Real children looked at Jenny Keen and she was neither a nice old 
lady nor a stranded fish, neither a grown-up nor another bigger kid. 
So what was simple about her? (GW:3) 
Her fractured sense of time finds expression on a number of occasions. 
When one of Digger's sudden narratives alerts her to the past existence of a 
sibling: 
She could have turned her head then and seen him, but she had to 
protect herself; she didn't want him to become too real. If he did she 
would only miss him when he was gone again or he'd start groWing 
up and become a nuisance. (GW:9) 
Constructing narratives is not something that comes easily to Jenny. For her 
it is a tortured step-by-step process of making the connections and 
assembling them into some sort of order. Her articulation of these narratives 
is even more difficult, often having an inappropriateness that emphasises 
her temporal disjunction. Her inability to reconcile the passing of time with 
respect to Vic's son Greg is an example of this. (GW:68) 
Jenny, like Digger, temporarily breaks away from Keen's Crossing. 
Incarceration and misery are found in Brisbane as they are in the Malayan 
Peninsula and Thailand but this parallel is less surprising than Jenny's 
assessment of it. It is an assessment which places personal experience as the 
only basis for knowledge and the only basis for history. She considers of 
Digger that: 
He knew a lot, he knew heaps, he could do things. But he didn't know 
about the world, and she did. She knew how cruel it was. (GW:65) 
It is tempting at first to see this belief as misguidance on the part of Jenny, 
that Digger has experienced a tremendous amount of cruelty. He has 
suffered horrific degradation but he has, however, never been far from 
some nobility of spirit or kindness - such as the self sacrifice of Mac or the 
mutual support of Vic and himself. 
Jenny's experience, to her, is one of unrelenting hardship: 
But [the blows] kept coming down just the same, all suds, over your 
left ear or across your face, with all the weight of a six foot Irish 
virgin behind them, her temper got up by the fact that you had 
fallen, and been picked up again, and were still no good. The weight 
of the whole Catholic Church as well - and she wasn't even a Mick! 
(GW:66) 
She is able to articulate, at least to herself, the difference between Digger's 
experience and her own. It is her own that is seen as, relatively, the more 
terrible. 
The terror of what was possible out there, the cruelty of some people 
and how helpless you were once they got stuck into you. You don't 
need all that much experience. Two seconds flat and she'd got to the 
end of her own power to bear it, that was the point. There's nothing 
more. 
The difference between her and Digger was that Digger had 
not. He'd never come up against whatever it was, out there, that 
could utterly flatten him. (GW:67-8) 
The prisoner of war experiences which fail to flatten Digger and Vic 
are developed in the novel at a number of levels. At one level they can be 
seen as l retelling of what is a distinctively Australian historical narrative. 
At anotner level they can be seen as a metaphorical construction of de-
centredness or of the relation of the spatial to the historical. Amanda 
Nettelbeck (1992) draws attention to the figure of the Burma railway line as a 
device which serves to draw together the different subjectivities of the men 
working on it. More than this, she sees the line as bridging gaps between 
different worlds. 
The laying of the line by the men adds to the body of communal 
linear history; they make a history that will become not only a part 
of Australian national consciousness but also a reminder of 
international gullt. Yet the laying of the line also contributes to ""that 
other history"; it gives the men a line to walk on in a place that does not 
otherwise reflect their presence there. (1992:50) 
While the representation of the camp is one in which space, history and 
narrative are conflated, it is also one in which questions of ontology and 
epistemology are foregrounded. In this sense it is possible to see the 
prisoners as trapped in a reality which is outside the parameters of their 
metaphysics, but also, necessarily, subject to interpretation within such 
batmdaries. The parable of Plato's cave serves as a useful paradigm for 
examination of the questions involved. 
While Plato's cave is primarily concerned with hierarchies of 
knowledge and of being, it is also concerned with changes in the ways that 
individuals metaphysically deal with their circumstances. It is the ascent of 
the individual from the position of slave to philosopher that is privileged in 
Plato's analogy but there is also discussion of the ways in which the 
methodologies employed in interpreting the cave are necessarily different 
from those employed in the sunlight. 
Malours treatment of the prisoner's railway camp is one which is 
.. Jre concerned with the effects of a descent from the metaphysical 'light' 
into the 'dark'. There is constant reference to the inadequacy or 
inappropriateness of the men's established systems of making sense of their 
present situation; their modes of knowing and being must become more 
concerned with the empirical, with the elemental, with the physical but also 
with the shadow images of memory and imagination. 
The alertness to their own bodies and to the recognition that what 
they are and their continued existence, is contingent so much on the 
physical, forms a large part of their change in world view: 
They had never given them much thought, these rough and ready 
bodies of theirs. You got that drummed into you early; not to look at 
it, not to touch. (GW:140) 
As their bodies waste away, their past inattention to, their lack of knowledge 
of, their physical forms is brought home to them: 
They hadn't known (and might have expected, in the normal way of 
things, never to have brought home to them), how much of what 
they were was dependent only on the meat. (GW:l41) 
Where the mind had guided the body, it is now the body, and its fickleness, 
that guides the mind: 
You got to be an expert at last on the tricks it could play, this body 
that was so crude and filthy a thing but was also precious and had to 
be handled now with so much delicacy. (GW: 141) 
In Plato's terms, this certainly represents a descent. It is not a descent from 
the lofty heights of philosophical dialogue for it is from "a half dozen 
schooners", a "run at football on Saturday arvo" and " a bit of love~making" 
(GW:140} that the men have been displaced. It is, however, no less of a 
descent for that: 
Their bodies had gone berserk and were dragging them back to a 
time before they had organised themselves into human form and 
come in from chaos. (GW:142) 
This idea of descent is also developed in terms of mythological and spiritual 
imagery. The camp certainly has a hellish quality and the clearing in the 
jungle where the bodies of the choltra victims are cremated, particularly so: 
You were in the antechamber here of the next world - that's what 
the perpetual blue-grey gloom and the eternal dampness of the 
place told you; .. (GW:156) 
The cremation process is itself shown to be horrifyingly apocalyptic: 
... the dead, who after twenty-four hours were no more than the 
driest sticks, should suddently, when the teak logs under them roared 
into flame, sigh and sit uptight, start bolt upright in the midst of the 
flames. (GW:l57) 
While there is without doubt, a sense of hellishness, of darkness and of 
incomprehensible deprivation, there are also elements of the light; systems 
which sustain the sense of the individual identity and the value of the 
individual. 
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The recollection of past knowledges is one strategy which keeps a link 
between the light and the dark: 'Memory was a gift, when they really set 
themselves to it.' (GW:148) It is not simply memory which offers some sort of 
promise for the prisoners, it is a re-writing of that memory: 
Got into the right order, like the combination of a safe, they were a 
key that would unlock the universe. Only you had to get the order 
right, and it wasn't all that easy since the right order had nothing to 
do with the one in which these numbers had. fli'St come into your 
life. (GW:148) 
Digger, in addition to his remarkable memory, has an ability to 
transpose his imagination beyond the constraints of his circumstances. In 
the delerium of his fever he mentally returns to the Crossing and receives 
sustenance of a sort from that. Imagining himself into his dog's kennel: 
Some animal part of him, which he loved as he had loved Ralphie, 
and which was Ralphie, wolfed it down ... took the strength from it 
and was enlightened. (GW:137) 
This re-inventing of personal history privileges the power of the 
imagir.o.ation over immediate experience. In Plato's model, it is as if the 
prisoners were each projecting their own images on to the walls. But it is 
not for everyone; Vic has 'no time for memories' (GW:150) and clings to the 
material - in the form of his piece of cotton. 
This little object serves to draw one of the major distinctions between 
Digger and Vic. For Digger, the way of suzvival, of maintaining a link with 
life and not being utterly flattened is to cling to the belief that there is some 
universal, or at least verifiable, principle at work: 
It was hard to keep your head in all this. It was a kind of madness, 
but there was a thread of sanity in it, there bad to be; in all the twists 
and turns, a clear straight line into life. (GW:154) 
But for Vic there is no clear straight line. The thing in which he places his 
faith is, significantly, 'tied in a loop.' (GW:lSl) That, in some ways, tnrns out 
to be a very good description of Vic himself; tied into a circle from which 
only at the very end is he able to escape, and only then by returning to his 
beginning. 
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Keen's Crossing does not represent some 'higher' metaphysical state. 
It is not place of great enlightenment for any of the figures who pass 
through it, with the possible exception of Vic, but it is a place which provides 
a fixed point of reference. It provides this stability in terms of time and of 
space; the Crossing does not substantially change - things around it do. 
Other places exist in contrast to it. This can be seen in relation to the 
prisoner's camp, for example, which exists in order to bring a railway line 
into existence - the Crossing is associated with a railway line already dead. 
The contrast between the place of cremation in the camp and Digger's first 
task on returning home, is clear. Clearing blackberry bushes, Digger finds 
numerous articles from the past that have been preserved and: 
.. shone out of the over-arching growth with an unnatural 
luminescence, as if they had managed somehow to preserve the last 
ray of sunlight they had been touched by, or the last moonlight, 
before a new shoot launched itself, knitted into the thicket and shut 
them in. (GW:ZZ7) 
After burning the foliage, the Crossing begins to resemble 'the Keen's 
Crossing he had left' (GW:ZZ8). Of his return to his mother, sister and home, 
Digger, considers that he is: 
Back, Digger thought, despite the seven yea, c..ld all that had 
happened, in a life that was barely different in its essentials from 
the one he had left. (GW:ZZ9) 
This is a stability, and it is one that is not found to the same degree in any 
oth-er place in the novel. 
King's Cross, despite the similarity in names, is a place of flux and 
transition. It is the figure that reflects most clearly the process of change 
and instability that exists separately from events of great, mythologised, 
significance. The Cross plays an important part in the lives of both Digger 
and Vic. It is not a place of pleasant revelations for either of them. 
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For Digger it is where he faces the reality that, as large as his memory and 
his capacity to experience are, there are things that will be lost: 
What he would have wanted, given the power, was to take it all back 
again, down to the last razor blade and button off a baby's bootee, and 
see it restored. Impossible, of course. 
He wanted nothing to be forgotten and cast into the flames. 
Not a soul. Not a pin. (GW:l79) 
For Vic the Cross is the place where he finally loses his son, or rather, 
realises the extent to which he and his son are completely apart. His 
essentialist argument, that Greg is 'attached' (308) to him can no longer 
stand up. The place he goes to in an attempt to put some sort of meaning back 
into his life is Keen's Crossing. 
Keen's Crossing is also the place of Vic's death. The timeless place of 
the Crossing is an appropriate location for Vic's demise, since his end is also 
a return to his beginning. 
The Great World asks ontological questions before it asks 
epistemological ones. The ideas with which it is concerned are certainly 
impacted on by epistemological dilemmas but there is still a sense in which 
the figures in the novel ask of themselves, 'Which world is this? What can be 
done in it? Which of my selves is to do it? For Vic, the answers are to be found 
in the way that he exists in a state of duality, of being never certain that 
where he is metaphysically is where he is supposed to be. For Digger, 
resolutions and reconciliations seem to some much easier, and it is hard to 
see that this is not because of his association with the Crossing. While Vic 




Remembering Babylon is concerned with the blurring of what have 
often been seen as 'natural' distinctions. In particular, the novel deals with 
the interfaces between different cultures; between nature and civilisation 
and between inscription and imagination. There are strong elements of 
difference established at various points, but these differences are often 
subordinated to the point at which they meet and become similarities, or are 
at least recognised for what they are. The effect of this is to expose cultural, 
racial, national and geographical divisions as arbitrary and completely 
unnatural. 
While the novel blurs boundaries and classifications, it also resists the 
location of a stable centre. Keen's Crossing at least offered the possiblility of 
a stable centre for the characters of The Great World. In Remembering 
Babylon there are no identifiable centres. The settlement into which Gemmy 
arrives is at the limit of white occupation. All of the figures are displaced 
from their 'centre' in some way, with Gemmy the only one originally from 
the hub of British colonial expansion, London. If the novel resists the idea of 
an unproblematic centre, it does not dismiss entirely the possiblilty of many 
shifting centres. 
Geography is one site of blurring and collision. As in The Great World 
, lines and divisions figure strongly. In this novel, however, the lines exist 
to be crossed rather than followed. The meeting of Gemmy and the settler 
children occurs in relation to two such geographic partitions. It is a natural 
barrier that is first traversed. Gemmy is seen: 
... hopping and flapping towards them out of a world over there, 
beyond the no-man's land of the swamp, that was the abode of 
everything savage and fearsome, ... superstitions and all that 
belonged to Absolute Dark. (RB:3) 
The second barrier or division is one emplaced by the settler community: 
The creature .. came to a halt, gave a kind of squawk, and leaping up 
onto the top rail of the fence, hung there, its arms outflung as if 
preparing for flight. (RB:3) 
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This fence turns out to be a point of transition for Gernmy, in a number of 
ways. The point marks the time when he ceases to become an 'it' and 
becomes a 'he'. The Lacanian implications of this transition will be explored, 
but there are other important boundaries that must be examined. 
Water for Malouf has often featured, as it did for the Great Writer in 
Child's Play, as a 'regenerative symbol'. In The Great World, Digger is 
restored to health in the river, at the conclusion of Fly Away Peter the figure 
in the surf is ru.~ Ufrrmation of new life. In Remembering Babylon the river 
provides moments of great illumination for jock Mcivor. He marvels at a 
bird drinking at tbe creek: 
.. and how long the threads of water must be to run so easily from 
where they had come to wherever it was, imaginably out of sight, 
tbat tbey were going - tangling, untangling, running free. (RB:108) 
This creek is not unproblematically regenerative, however. It also raises the 
possibility of knowledges and forms of expression beyond what Mcivor 
considers to be in the 'natural' order of things: 
The tbings he had begun to be aware of, however fresh and 
innocent, lay outside what was common, or so he thought; certainly, 
since he could have found no fonn in which to communicate them, 
outside words. (RB:l08) 
In a sense, it is a word that disrupts Jock's rapport with the river. At the 
vandalised shed, Jock imagines: 
.. tbe hand witb its load of filtb moving across tbe wall and 
understood now that what it was setting there was a word ... He got to 
his feet and went swiftly to tbe creek .. and scrubbed his hands but 
he discovered that he bad no belief any longer in tbe water's power 
to cleanse. (RB:116) 
The creek also becomes the site of Gemmy's physical rejection by the settlers 
(121-2). He has his head thrust into a sack and is half-drowned by tbe 
Mcivor's neighbours. At the same time, however, it becomes the site of a 
closeness between Jock and Gemmy ( 126) tbat has been absent up until tbat 
point. 
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The novel closes with another aquatic geographical boundary, that of the 
shoreline. This division is developed as one which is indefinable, as it is 
subject to the constant movement of the tides. While the coastline. is a 
perimeter, a point of arrival (for Gem.my) and containment, it is dynamic and 
unstable. The central figures in the novel are characterised by a similar 
resistance to quantification or qualification, by a similar ebb and flow. 
Gemmy is a figure who experiences marginalisation and rejection at a 
number of levels and for a variety of reasons. His earliest state is described as 
being that of an insect pupae, 'the maggot stage' (RB:l46). It is at this level 
that he is associated closely with machines; in fact he is sustained by their 
waste: 
... oily grime round the base of the machines and the bolt-heads 
that fixed them to the floor, which they picked out with their 
nails, mixed with sawdust, and ate. (RB:146) 
These machines, unlike the soap vats which so impress Vic, have no duality, 
no redeeming poetry other than that they provide a place for the communal 
nestling: 'curled up in close heaps' of Gemmy and the other 'maggots' 
(RB:147). 
The first individual that Gemmy has memory of is Willett. His 
memories of his cir..:umstances as a subject of this ferreter are those which 
produce demons which 'live in rooms' (RB:147). Like his time under the 
machines, the striking images that recur to Gemmy are those associated with 
the floor, with comparisons in scale and with himself as an insignificant 
figure: 
It is a fearful thing to be faced in the dark by a pair of cracked 
leather boots, all their eyeholes tom, their laces trailing, the loose 
tongues charred and smelling of flame. (RB:147) 
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Everything is twisted around in the London of Willett and Gemmy. All 
animals are domesticated for purposes other than food; the horses, whose 
fresh dung provides warmth to Gemmy's feet ( l 50), the ferrets which clear 
the rats from Regent's Park (149) and the rats themselves - which become 
the players in a blood-sport. Gemmy himself is little more than a domestic 
animal whose only protection is the patronage of Willett: ' .. he has a place, he 
is 'Someone's Boy' (149). 
Gemmy's post-arson escape fmds him, somehow, on a ship. Whether 
in his panic he climbed the rat-lines and awoke in the merchant navy, or 
whether he was discovered somewhere and pressed into maritime service is 
unclear. This is in keeping with all of the othe:- changes in Gemmy's life -
with , perhaps, the exception of that tumble from the fence between white 
and black worlds - it is the transition that is blurred, not the reality of 
arriving. 
The years that Gemmy spends before the mast could be two, or they 
could be three; his own internal narrative is unclear on the point. Certainly 
he recalls a carpenter who had a daughter who could turn herself into a seal. 
Given the circumstances under which Gemmy calls these figures of his past 
to mind, this is not a particualrly extraordinary phenomenon - he himself 
has been a transmogrified sea creature. 
The Aboriginal people who find Gemmy seem to be used to the 
possibility of transformation between human and animal; between earthly 
and spiritual. Finding the cast away white boy they consider: 
What was it? A sea creature of a kind they had never seen before 
from the depths beyond the reef? A spirit. a feeble one, come back 
from the dead and only half rebom7(RB:ZZ) 
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Gemmy's response to his benefactors is th..at he is: 'more lost than ever' and 
that it is ' .• not what I expected' (RB:23) It is not what the Aboriginal people 
expected either. He does not face subjugation or rejection but nei·her does 
he inherit unconditional acceptance: 
He was accepted by the tribe but guardedly; in the droll half-
apprehensive way that was proper to an in-between creature. 
(RB:28) 
The novel, particularly with respect to Gemmy, establishes a frightful 
series of Lacanian problems. The most difficult of these, and the one to 
which other problems appear to lead, is perhaps that which is stated at the 
fence interface between the 'Absolute Dark' and the white symbolic realm: 
Then the ragged mouth gapped. 'Do not shoot,' it shouted. 
'I am a B-b-british object!' (RB:3) 
This statement is doubly problematic since it occurs at the beginning of the 
novel. While a temporally continuous I.ananian appraisal of Gemmy may be 
useful, it must be observed that in terms of the narrative there is a great deal 
of temporal discontinuity. The figure of Gemmy, however, informs, 
fractures (and is informed and fractured by) Lacanian theory so much, that 
to neglect this approach would seem to ignore a major theme of the novel. 
That it is machines that are most closely associated with the very early 
years of Gemmy is something which resists an appraisal in terms of 
Lacanian human development. This is considerably emphasised in the way 
that 'maggot' images are developed. It seems to be a denial of the mother 
figure, but, the mother and the breast are still there as the machines and the 
oily material which the 'maggots' eat. Gemmy passes unproblematically, in 
the way the novel is constructed, from imaginary to symbolic realms: 
The frrst being he has memory of. Before Willett there is only 
darkness, his life as a maggot, the giant legs of the machines. 
(RB:147) 
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There is, here, a short-circuiting of the Oedipal crisis which would normally 
precipitate such a transition. In this way Gemmy cannot be said to have 
fully entered the symbolic realm. In fact, the whole Lacanian progression is 
further disordered with the appearance of Mag . 
.. [When Mag is with them] sometimes, on Willetts suggestion, when 
they've all been drinking together, takes Wm on her lap like an 
overgrown baby, and gives him her breast to suck, and, to Willett's 
vast amusement, frigs him under his shirt till he is squealing. 
(RB:lSl) 
His act of arson takes place after this, when he is 'eleven or twelve years old' 
and 'has resentments'. This could be seen as an attempt to resolve something 
of an Oedipal conflict, but it is destined to remain an incomplete act. We are 
told that 'he had not meant to set himself loose in the world' and the he is lost 
and 'would remain so till Willett .. turned up again to curse and wallop him' 
(RB:153). 
Gemmy's rebirth on the shore of Australia, as 'half-child, half-seacalr 
(27) is one which necessitates an abandoning of much of that part of the 
symbolic realm that he had arrived at: 
Young enough to learn and to be shaped as if for the first time, he 
was also young enough also to forget. He lost his old language in the 
new one that came to his lips. (RB:26) 
The realm of his past is never quite disposed of; the figure of Willett remains 
strong and there is a sense in which he is separated but not entirely separate 
from his earlier existence. Of the fleeting recollections of his time with 
Willett he: 
.. could only believe .. that they belonged to the life of some other 
creature whose memory be shared, and which rose up at moments to 
shake him, then let him go. (RB:27) 
When Gemmy stands on that fence and ntakes that plea to Lachlan, he 
is at a point where he is imperfectly subject to two different symbolic orders. 
When he calls himself a 'B-b-british object' he is saying a great deal more 
than he realises. 
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The 'object(a)' for Lacan is that residue of what is incorporated into 
the symbolic order, it is a substitute for the absent post-Oedipal mother. 
Terry Eagleton puts in the following terms: 
To enter language is to be severed from what lacan calls the 'real', 
that inaccessible realm which is always beyond the reach of 
signification, always outside the symbolic order. ..[Mter being 
separated from the mother's body] we will spend all our lives 
hunting for it. We have to make do instead with substitute objects, 
what Lacan calls the 'object little a', with which we try vainly to plug 
the gap at the very centre of our being. 
(Eagleton:l983.168) 
That Gemmy, who has ottly partially entered the symbolic order himself, and 
is specifically constructed as having no recollection of his mother, should 
describe himself as an 'object' is appropriate. Part of this stems from the fact 
that he has so vainly attempted to plug a very large gap at the centre of his 
being, but also because of his relation to the other figures in the novel. 
For the Aboriginal people, Genuny occupies a position which can be 
seen as neither fully in nor fully out of their collective symbolic order, 
decribed as an 'in-between creature' (28), he is subject to exclusive 
exclusions: 
No woman, for example would have to do with him, and there were 
many objects in the camp he was forbidden to touch .... the 
restrictions on him were his and his alone ... (28) 
The community regards his uneasy sleep, broken by incongruous images and 
whisperings in his half-forgotten language, as evidence he is not fully 
formed. Hi~ night time cries are: 
... proof that although he had the look of a man, he was not one, not 
yet. A day would come when, fully arrived among them, he would let 
go of the other world. (RB:28) 
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He occupies a similar positon with respect to the children who encounter 
him at the fence. Lachlan, who at the moment of Gemmy's appearance is 
occupying an imaginary space in snow covered Russia, is unable to 
satisfactorily place Gemmy within any realm of experience: 
... the thing, as far as he could make it out.. was not even, maybe, 
human. The stick-like legs, all knobbled at tbe joints, suggested a 
wounded waterbird .. [or a human tbat had been] changed into a bird, 
but only halfway .. (RB:Z) 
This impression is replaced by one in which he perceives Gemmy as an 
animated scarecrow. Whatever he is seen as, it is not initally as a subject, as 
a human. He is seen as an incomplete object. His shouted claim, in English, 
to be treated as a British object places him, again incompletely, into the 
symbolic order of Lachlan and tbe otbers. 
Anotber dimension of Gemmy's appeal is that it takes tbe form of a slip 
in the language, a moment of dicontinuity and fracture where the 
unconscious shows through - what Freud called parapraxis and what has 
often subsequently been termed the Freudian slip. For Lacan, all language is 
fraught with similar ambiguity and dispersion. Eagleton claims of Lacan 
tbat: 
If all language is as slippery and ambiguous as he suggests, we can 
never mean precisely what we say, and never say precisely what we 
mean .. We can never articulate the truth in some 'pure' unmed.iated 
way. 
(Eagleton.1983:169) 
Lacan himself approaches this question as an epistemological problem, 
stating of any utterance that: 
It is not a question of knowing whetber I speak of myself in a way 
that conforms to what I am , but ratber of knowing whether I am tbe 
same as tbat of which I speak. (I.odge.1988:96) 
Gemmy is constructed as a character who is more concerned with the latter 
approach. His central dilemma is that he 'speaks' as a subject who partially 
occupies two symbolic realms. In that sense he can never have an 
unproblematic knowledge that he is what he 'speaks' of. 
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Narratively, his subjectivity will eventually turn out to be Aboriginal. He 
loses his status as a British object only when he is, in death, reduced to the 
status of a literal 'object'. 
There were bones - not so many. Eight parcels of bark, two of 
child size, resting a little above eye-level. 
He looked at one dry bundle, then another - they were not 
distinguishable - and felt nothing more for one that for any of them. 
(RB:197) 
The figure of Lachlan is much less defined by his initial appearance 
in the novel than is Gerruny. There is a great deal less ambiguity as to who he 
is and what he is about. There is omission in how he came to be where he is, 
but this represents far less of a crisis or trauma than that which is omitted 
does for the figure of Gemmy. Unlike Gemmy, Lachlan's links with his past 
and with his home are strong. In particular, it is language and accent that 
operate to keep a link between his old and new centres: 
He began every sentence with 'At hame in Scotland' -yet at 
home, as she knew from her mother, they had been starVing. She 
would harden her heart and mock him ... He want red in the face and 
could barely hide his tears. 
She had her triumph. But seeing it she felt ashamed, it was so 
easy. And Scotland, home, was sacred to her. (RB:SS) 
While Gemmy attempts to use language to claim affinity or sameness, the 
young Lachlan uses it to emphasise a difference between himself and the 
Australian born Janet Mcivor, who still considers Scotland 'home'. The 
language, the code, that he is in possession of expands beyond merely 
understanding what a 'moothfu' o' mools' (56) means. The difference 
between Janet and Lachlan becomes based on masculine codes rather than 
linguistic ones: 
Being in possession of so many skills, and the code that went with 
them and belonged to men, he had put himself beyond reach. 
(RB:S8) 
-35-
Jock Mcivor has a more difficult relationship with codes of all types. 
He is uncomfortable, with imagination, with himself and with the 
community codes which serve to deny member status to Gemmy. His initial 
approach to the settler community, and to assure himself, is that Gemmy is 
'hairmless' (69). But he sees this only as a half truth, for he has already 
considered the way that Gemmy has the capacity to disturb him, not for what 
he is, but for the initial impression that he made: 
From the moment he saw the fellow he had felt a kind of repulsion, 
a moral one he thought, though it expressed itself physically. 
(RB:70) 
Jock's appraisal of Gemmy, and his articualtion of it is not dear cut. like the 
positions of his neighbours it is based on an irrational sense of fear at the 
way Gemmy is both familiar and different: 
It was the mixture of monstrous strangeness and unwelcome likeness 
that made Gemmy Fairley so distrubing to them, since at any moment 
he could show one face or the other. (RB:43) 
While Jock claims to be infuriated at the alarm that the stone allegedly given 
to Gemmy provokes in his neighbour, he harbours doubts himself about his 
ability to cope with the different cultural forces at work. (107). The 
development of 'difference' is constructed as being completely arbitrary 
here as, evidenced by the attacks on their farm, the Mclvors are ostracised -
marked as different - by what was previously regarded as their own 
community. 
The novel, in developing ideas of alienation and belonging, places 
considerable emphasis on the nature of inscription and encoding. the 
process of turning testament into manuscript is of great concern to Gemmy. 
For him, the written word becomes not a site of meaning but a site of his 
central being . 
... he knew what writing was but had never himself learned the trick 
of it. As he handled the sheets and turned them this way and that, 
and caught the pecullar smell they gave off, his whole life was in his 
throat. (RB:20) 
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This is initially a liberating or at least wakening experience for Genuny. The 
exposure of personal history, previously neither told nor written, is 
something that assists in his attempts to defme himself or at least locate 
himself within a recognisable framework: 
.. - and he was filled with an immense gratitude. He had shown 
them what he was. He was known.(RB:20) 
The irony of this belief, and of his gratitude, is that what has been 
transcribed exists in terms of the symbolic order of Frazer and Abbot. It has 
little or nothing to do with Gemmy's central being: 
... Gemmy, in his childish eagerness to provide Mr Frazer with 
whatever it was he wanted to bear, leaped at every suggestion, and 
once his own meagre fund gave out was only too pleased to have Mr 
Frazer find words for him.(RB:17) 
It is not just Frazer who is mediating Gemmy's story; George Abbot adds his 
own pieces of invention to the story. Not merely a 'change in the phrasing' 
but a wilful 'alteration of fact'( 19). The importance of this mediation is lost 
on Gemmy who, in the 'peculiar smell' of the ink, finds some sort of essential 
truth. He comes to regret the transfer of that essence to those seven pages. 
Suffering from nightmare images of the past, and sickening with a 
sense of dislocation at the Hutchence house, Genuny associates his state with 
the physical pages of his transcribed story: 
More and 1 nore now he was haunted by those sheets, seven in all ... 
till he wa'; convinced that the only way to save himself from sc nuch 
racking, a.nd despair and sweat, was to get them back again. All he 
needed was the strength to get there ... But that was just what thelr 
magic had drawn from him. (RB:154-5) 
The novel establishes inscription as being the site of falsity and 
disempowerment. It strongly develops the idea that those with access to 
inscribed language have power over those who do not. This is seen in the 
above case, but also in the daubing of the shed with excrement. 
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It is a destructive action which is directed at Gemmy and Jock but where the 
vandalism is inscribed reveals more of its significance: 
the shed Gemmy had been mending when his visitors arrived, the 
new planks in its wall, the new nail heads showing plainly in the 
weathered grey of the rest. And there, smeared across them was a 
stain, (RB:llS) 
The scrawl occurs at the physical point of Gemmy's entrance into the realm 
of the white settler. His participation in the 'civilising' process of creating 
permanent structures is denied by what is inscribed on the shed. The 
excrement becomes a figurative barrier between the 'natural' non-
inscriptive world from which Gemmy has just come, and the world of 
arbitrary assessments of difference inhabited by the likes of Andy McKillop. 
Jock is able to recognise how this inscription is an affront to worlds other 
than merely that occupied by language: 
And it seemed to him now that it was the sky that had been smeared, 
the earth, the water. The word was on them; some old darkness out of 
the depth of things was scribbled there forever, and could never 
now be eradicated. (RB:116) 
Inscription and encoding are present for Gemmy and the Aboriginal visitors 
that he receives, but in a radically different way. They are not associated 
with the constraining physical elements of pen and ink, nor with the 
violence present in •"1e soiling of the shed. As the three men sit outside the 
shed on which Gemmy has been working, 'the silence between them' 
becomes a 'conversation of another kind' (117). The earth between them: 
.. expanded and became the tract of land up there under the flight of 
air and the stars of the night sky, that was the tribe's home 
territory, [with all it contains], all alive in their names and the 
stories that contained their spirit, for a man to walk into and print 
with the spirit of his feet and the invisible impact of his breath. 
(RB:l17) 
This is in complete contrast to the way in which the settlers inscribe; it is the 
difference between 'printing with the spirit of his feet' and writing 
nonsense with a pen, or obscenities with filth. Jock, in the way that he is 
alert to the natural world can be seen as straddling both positions. 
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It is janet Mcivor, however? who is most concerned with reconciling the 
language of the natural world with that of civilisation. 
Janet, or Sister Monica, becomes dedicated to decoding the 'Great 
Secret' ( 191) of bee communication. It is an enterprise which can be traced 
back to her complete envelopment by these insects, an envelopment which 
takes the form of a marriage between humanity and 'nature': 
You are our bride, her new and separate mind told her as it drummed 
and swayed above the earth. (RB:l42) 
The bees that she studies are themselves a kind of union between natural and 
cultural realms - crossbreeds that: 'the earth had never known till she called 
them' (143). The solution to her problem, however, remains elusive: 
.. her mind in its human shape could not grasp it, though there had 
been a moment, long ago, when she had known it, of this she was 
convinced. (R:192) 
The inscription of bee language becomes evidence of an 'international 
conspiracy' (189lt linked in the newspapers with Lachlan's support of 
another supposed interloper - the German pastry cook. All of this serves to 
set up inscription as the site of ambiguity and mis-interpretation; as a 
process which can easily be appropriated to produce difference and 
alienation. 
Gemmy is able, in part, to reclaim the power that he lost to the seven 
pages of transcription. What he claims back from Abbot is physically 
nothing more than the jottings of schoolchildren, what he claims back 
spiritually is much more important. In a wider sense, however, the wilful 
lies and apocrypha remain tangible in Mr Frazer's notes. Like all written 
texts they have the potential to persist and to again and again become the 
sites of alienation and disempowerment. 
Doubt, error, change and refusal to change are the elements which 
characterise any examination of the novel in terms of epistemoligcal 
regimes. Language, particularly written language, is shown, at all levels, to 
be inadequate in reflecting any great truth or offering any stability. 
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Memory is always fleeting and incomplete; fading and re-emerging to 
confound and disturb. The realm of the immediate senses is, in the case of 
Jock, the site of incomprehension, while for Genuny it is a transcendent part 
of a much greater system of knowing. 
David Malouf expresses hope that: 
.• by the end of Remembering Babylon, the reader, by the genuine 
process of looking, understanding and going deeper, will feel less 
confident about making easy assessments of people and categories. 
(Hawley:l993) 
The novel seems to fulfil this wish in the way that it exposes the fragility of 
any distinction between sameness and difference; between belonging and 
being alien. 
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Imagining Australia: The Stone 
Personal epistemologies and ontologies are key features of the novels 
of David Malouf. What characterises them in the body of his work is their 
tendency to be incomplete, or in some way inadequate. Peter Pierce observed 
this sense of incompleteness in terms of the relationships within the early 
novels: 
[Patrick "White and] Malouf bave been writing of the sense of 
incompleteness in the lives of some men who seek intense and 
dependent relationships with other men. That incompleteness is not 
simply a social or emotional matter. The fictions of Malouf and White 
rise to engagement with metaphysical concerns seriously ... 
(Pierce.1982:526-534) 
This view is borne out, to some extent, in two of the three novels examined 
here. In Child's Play there is an intense dependence, on the part of the 
terrorist, on the Great Writer. In The Great World Vic and Digger establish 
an interdependence which is marked by incompleteness in both parties. The 
position becomes harder to sustain in Remembering Babylon, since there 
are no really intense or dependent relationships to be found. lt could be 
argued that there is an interdependence between Gemmy and Lachlan but 
their relationship lacks the intensity of Vic and Digger, or of Ashley and Jim 
in Fly Away Peter. While Remembering Babylon does not bave the same 
kind of relationships as other novels by Malouf, it still has the same attention 
to metaphysical concerns. 
David Malouf's novels are not primarily explorations of human 
relationships. These relationships are present, and often strongly present, 
but are subordinated to the wider themes of knowledge, identity and 
interpretation. 
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There is the image of a stone or pebble in David Malouf's work that can 
be traced back to An Imaginary life: 
The fullness is in the Child's moving away from me, in his stepping 
so llgbtly, so joyfully, naked, into his own distance at last as he fades 
in and out of the dazzle of light off the water and stoops to gather -
what? Pebbles? Is that what his eye is attracted by now, the greyest 
most delicately veined of them? .. the useless pebbles that where 
they strike the ground suddenly flare up as butterflies, whose bright 
wings rainbow the stream. (IL:152) 
Another pebble appears in Child's Play, as the terrorist's last link with the 
world of childhood imagination and with the 'tide of energy' that is 'out 
there' (CP:63): 
Antaeus retained his strength so long as he could touch the earth, 
and I suppose we are meant to understand by this fable that there is 
between us and nature a channel through which energy endlessly 
flows, and feed us an keeps us whole. (CP:62) 
Yet another pebble, or stone, is seen at the time of Vic's death in The Great 
World: 
She wretched her hand loose, jabbering, and when she got it free 
she had hold of a smooth little stone about the size of a kidney, same 
colour too, which she thought for a moment he ntlght have sicked 
up. She stared at it. (GW:323) 
Finally, in Remembering Babylon, there is an imaginary stone that, for all 
its lack of substance, causes considerable trouble: 
And the stone, once launched, had a life of its own. It flew in all 
directions, developed a capacity to multiply, accelerate, leave 
wounds; and the wounds were real even if the stone was not, and 
would not heal. (RB:102) 
The image of the stone in the three earlier novels is a comforting conflation 
of the tangible, that which may be held in the hand, and the spiritual or 
metaphysical. In these novels it is a real stone which acquires a dimension 
beyond simple solidity. In Remembering Babylon the stone is 
representative of something more disturbing. It is imaginary but acquires 
the ability to act as if solid. 
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In the novels of David Malouf, the individual possesses the capacity to 
exist on a variety of metaphysical planes, to have shifting regimes of 
knowledge, and to be empowered by the potentialities of imagination. There 
is still a sense, however, that the works look beyond the spiritual and 
metaphysical concerns of individuals. National identity and the problems 
associated with trying to defme it are also of great concern for Malouf. 
Just as individuals in the texts have (imperfect, incomplete, 
apocryphal and contradictory) epistemological regimes, so do nations. I 
would argue that the national equivalent of a regime of knowing is the 
mythologised 'history' of that nation. For much, or perhaps even most, of 
white Australia there is a body of mythologised history which bears little or 
no relation to the world as mediated by the senses. It is a collective regime of 
deductive knowing; I think of Gallipoli therefore I am an Australian (or New 
Zealander). The process is also deductive in the sense that it requires the 
deduction of other mythologies and histories from the equation; it takes the 
Turks (the English and the New Zealanders?) out of Gallipoll. 
David Malouf consistently de-stabilises what have come to be national 
epistemologies. In relation to Australian participation in warfare he stays 
away from Gallipoli and in Fly Away Peter, as Philip Nielson observes, he: 
... makes some further adjustments to the traditional Anzac myth. 
Throughout his war scenes, he avoids any idealization of the 
Australian soldiers. They are portrayed as ordinary people 
demonstrating courage and persistence under grotesque 
circumstances (as are the Australian prisoners of war in The Great 
World). (Neilson:1990.105) 
This is not to say that Malouf is concerned with figuratively putting the 
Turks back into Gallipoli or addressing some perceived great wrong in the 
way history has been inscribed. It is much more a case of translating a 
national epistemology into a national ontology. The epistemological 
questions, returning to McHale's quote of Higgins paradigm, that can be 
asked of a national identity are something like : How can I interpret this 
[Australia, for example] of which I am a part? And what am I in it? 
(McHale:1987.9). The 'I' and the· Australia' are posed as unproblematic 
-43-
entities. The questions asked of a national ontology are of the order: 'What is 
[Australia]7 What kinds of [Australia ] are there, how are they constituted 
and how do they differ; what happens when different kinds of [Australia] are 
placed in confrontation, or when boundaries between [Australias] are 
violated 7' (McHale:1987.10) 
In the three novels examined here, all of the questions, both 
epistemological and ontological are asked. Whether they are asked of 
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